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APPELLANTS PETITION FOR REHEARING
JURISDICTION AND PETITION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter p u r s u a n t to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k).

Appellant petitions this Court for a

rehearing of this matter p u r s u a n t to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

1

STATEMENT OF THE PETITION AND RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Statement of the Petition
1.

This is a petition for rehearingfromthe Opinion entered by this Court

on January 25, 1995. (See Addendum)
2.

This petition originates from an appeal from a trial held on June 23,

1992, in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the
Honorable James S. Sawaya.
3.

ThefinalJudgment and the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law

was entered on December 23, 1992.
4.

The Notice of Appeal was filed with the Third District Court on March

2, 1993, with the Docketing Statement filed on or about April 13, 1993.

II.

Statement of the Facts
This petition incorporates by reference the "Statement of Relevant Facts"

contained in Brief of Appellant.
SUMMARY OF PETTTTON
This case is the Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins. Brown and Ounnell.
Inc.. 784 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1989) case revisited with the trial court ruling
contrary to the precedent of this Court. In the Opinion, this Court follows PriceOrem as to one issue, and ignores it on two others. This Court properly found
that pre-judgment interest is not available in this case, but failed to follow PriceOrem with respect to the measure of damages and costs. Based upon these

2

errors, which are analyzed in more detail below, Calder urges this Court to revisit
these issues and follow its previous rulings in Price-Orem.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN A NEGLIGENT SURVEY
CASE IS AN ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE OF THE REAL ESTATE AT
THE TIME OF THE NEGLIGENT ACT.
Appellees filed this lawsuit against Calder asserting the cause of action
based on negligence.1 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is a causal
connection between a negligent act of Calder which resulted in some damage to
the Appellees, the measure of damages used by the trial court was inappropriate.
Further, the law cited by this Court in upholding the trial court's ruling is
contrary to this Court's prior ruling in Price-Orem. a case which is directly on
point. Accordingly, the Opinion acts as a reversal of Price-Orem.
In review, this Court held in Prlce-Orem. that when measuring damages in
the negligent surveying case:
the measure of damages for permanent injury to real property is the
difference between the market value of the property immediately
before and immediately after the injury.2 (emphasis added)
This Court went on to state that:

1

See, Third Party Complaint.

2

Price-Qrem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown, and Gunnel,
Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989).
3

[bjecause liability attached at the time of the loss [the appraisal made
near that time] is more relevant to the actual loss incurred under this
measure of damages than the subsequent historical data. (Id.) (See
also Aultv. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1987).
The Appellees purchased the property in 1971 for $5,500. 3 The negligent
act, if any, by Calder occurred in 1972. Therefore, the damages would be the
difference in value of the property right before the negligent act and the value of
the property right after the negligent act in 1972.
The trial court, however, inappropriately considered the value of the land
1983 4 in comparison to the value of the property at the time of trial. As set forth
in Price-Orem. the analysis of subsequent historical data is an inappropriate
basis to measure damages. The Opinion issued by this Court does not follow
Price-Orem. Calder respectfully requests that this Court review this issue, follow
it previous ruling in Price-Orem and remand this issue to the trial court to receive
evidence as to the value of the property at the time of the alleged negligent act.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING OF FAIR MARKET VALUE IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Assuming that the fair market value of the property at the time of trial is
pertinent, which the above argument and Prlce-Orem represent that it is not, the

3

Ex, P-6.

4

R i g h t l y R. 401 - 402.

Wilkerson R. 436.
4

trial court's finding of the fair market value is not supported by the evidence. In
referring to the evidence presented, the only valuations given are from the
testimony of the Appellees' expert witness. He testified of an offer for the property
in the amount of $10,000, but the Appellees turned the offer down.5 When asked
what the present value of the property was, Appellees' expert testified that it was
worth $8,000, not $6,000 as stated on Ex. P-9. 6 This exhibit was only admitted
for only illustrative purposes. In closing arguments, Appellees' counsel confirmed
that the evidence presented at trial was that the present value of the property was
$8,000. 7 Appellees' counsel in oral arguments before this Court once again
reiterated the value as $8,000. 8 Appellees have not claimed otherwise.
There is no rational, legal or factual basis whatsoever to support the
accounting as set forth in Exhibit P-9. The trial court clearly applied an incorrect
measure of damages. Appellees acknowledge the error. This award must be
reversed or modified to correctly reflect the evidence presented at trial as
confirmed by Appellees' counsel.

5

R. 445, 450.

6

R. 448.

7

Closing Arg. pg. 10.

8

Oral Arguments, Tape #447, counter 2095 and 2132.
5

POINT HI
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED COSTS IN THIS CASE
As set forth at length in Appellant's Brief, there are parameters which are
provided to the courts when it comes to awarding costs. Many of the costs
claimed are inappropriate, contrary to law, completely contrary to the Minute
Entry ruling of the trial court, and/or confirmed as being inappropriate by
Appellees1 counsel during oral arguments before this Court.9
Calder has described in great detail the errors and abuse of discretion which
was committed by the trial court in the awarding of costs as they relate to witness,
clerk, constable, and reporter fees along with the "miscellaneous costs" claimed
by the Appellees. Furthermore, Appellees did not dispute the assertions set forth
in Appellant's Brief and Appellees counsel during oral argument stated that at
least three of the costs awarded were inappropriate and should be disallowed.10
Despite this acknowledgment of error, the Opinion affirms the awarding of costs
in a footnote.
Accordingly, Calder requests that this Court revisit this issue and reverse
the trial courts award of costs.

9
10

See, Closing Argument, Tape #447.
See, Closing Argument, Tape #447.
6

CONCLUSION

Assuming Calder was negligent, the law set forth in Price-Orem does not
support the amount of damages awarded by the trial court. The appropriate
measure of damages for a negligent survey is to compare the fair market value
both immediately before and immediately after the negligent act in 1972, This
analysis was not followed and the award must be reversed.
Nevertheless, if this Court were to uphold the valuation process of the
damages, the amount must, at a minimum, be reduced to reflect the evidence
presented as conceded by Appellees1 counsel.
The trial court improperly assessed costs in this case. The trial court
erroneously awarded costs contrary to its own Minute Entry decision, contrary to
law, costs from other actions, which Appellees1 counsel has confirmed as being
improper. This Court must reverse the trial court's awarding of costs.
This petition for rehearing is hereby certified to be brought in good faith and
not for delay and is respectfully submitted this _

of February, 1995.

WALSTAD & BABCOCK

By: RobertHUtftiU
F. Babcock
Brian J. Babcock
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE QF MAILING

I certify that on this £ _ day of February, 1995,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING to be mailed,
postage prepaid, to:
Ephram H. Fankhauser
243 East 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Robert B. Klinger and Karol J.
Klinger,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Eugene E. Kightly, Helen L.
Kightly, Harry D. Kreis, Peggy
R. Kreis Barnett,
Defendants, Third-Party
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
Glen H. Calder, and John Doe
Wilson, individually and dba
Wilson Calder,
Third-Party Defendants
and Appellant.

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No. 930525-CA
F I L E D
( J a n u a r y 2 5 , 1995)

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable James S. Sawaya
Attorneys:

Robert F. Babcock and Brian J. Babcock, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Wilkins.
JACKSON, Judge:
In this third-party suit, Glen H. Calder appeals the trial
court's judgment in favor of Eugene E. Kightly, Helen L. Kightly,
Harry D. Kreis, and Peggy R. Kreis Barnett (third-party
plaintiffs). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
On June 2, 1971, third-party plaintiffs bought thirty acres
of land in Duschesne County for $5,550 from Strawberry River

Estates (Strawberry River) by a uniform real estate contract*1
The original parcel was "T"-shaped, with about twenty acres west
of Red Creek and about ten acres east of Red Creek. On October
3, 1971, by handwritten agreement,2 Strawberry River conveyed to
third-party plaintiffs two unmarketable five-acre parcels on each
side of the ten acres east of Red Creek. Strawberry River drew
up a new uniform real estate contract back-dated to June 2, 1971,
using a new metes and bounds description which—unbeknownst to
third-party plaintiffs—contained an incorrect point of beginning
one thousand feet east of where the description in the original
contract and the handwritten agreement began.3 The new
description omitted the twenty acres west of Red Creek.

1. The metes and bounds description of the parcel on this
contract stated:
Beginning 990' South of the North line of
Section 11, Township 4 South, Range 8 West,
USM, to center of Red Creek, Thence West
1320 , / Thence South 660', Thence East 1320',
Thence North 165', Thence East 1320', Thence
North 330', Thence West 1320', Thence North
165' to beginning point at center of Red
Creek, Consisting of Thirty (30) acres and no
more.
2.

The agreement reads in pertinent part as follows:
This is to certify that all of lots 30 and 31
along Red Creek . . . as platted by Edmund W.
Allen, Civil Engineer . . . , shall be
included in the Contract of Sale . . . and
that the Contract of Sale will be modified to
include this additional acreage at no
additional cost, and that the total acreage
will amount to forty (acres) total on both
sides of the creek.

3.

The new metes and bounds description reads:
Beginning at a Point 320 feet West and 990
feet South of the Northeast Corner of Section
11, Township 4 South and Range 8 West,
U.S.M., thence West 2640 feet, thence South
660 feet, thence East 2640 feet, thence North
660 feet to Point of Beginning. Consisting
of forty acres.

930525-CA
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A few months later, Merrill Gunderson, Floyd Ostler, and
John Stafford were hired to survey the forty acres.4 They placed
rebar stakes in the property's corners, showing boundaries
consistent with third-party plaintiffs' understanding and the
informal description of the property in the handwritten
agreement, but inconsistent with the second metes and bounds
description. Subsequently, third-party plaintiffs received a
survey certificate dated May 15, 1972 and inscribed, "WILSON &
CALDER CONSULTING ENGINEERS AND SURVEYORS DUCHESNE UTAH." The
certificate showed a diagram of the property consistent with
third-party plaintiffs' understanding and the informal
description of the property from the handwritten agreement.
However, the certificate also showed the incorrect metes and
bounds description from the second real estate contract around
the diagram's perimeter. Because Gunderson, Ostler, and Stafford
were not licensed surveyors, they had paid Calder to sign the
certificate, which stated:
I, Glen H. Calder, do hereby certify
that I am a Registered Land Surveyor in the
State of Utah, and that the plat described
hereon portrays a survey made by me or under
my direction. I further certify that the
above plat correctly shows the true
4. The parties dispute who hired the surveyors. Third-party
plaintiffs claim they hired the surveyors, while Calder claims
Strawberry River hired the surveyors. The trial court made the
following findings regarding this issue:
7.
Although Third Party Plaintiffs had
been shown the approximate location of the 40
acre parcel, they made inquiry of Strawberry
River Estates about surveying the property.
Third Party Plaintiffs did not know any other
property owners who had had their property
surveyed. Because of their concerns and
reservations about the property description
in the new Uniform Real Estate Contract, they
wanted to establish the location and
boundaries of their property.
8.
Acting on information given by
representatives of Strawberry River Estates,
Third Party Plaintiffs (the Kightlys)
contacted a surveyor at the Duchesne office
of Third Party Defendant, Wilson Calder. Mr.
Kightly asked that the subject property be
surveyed to establish an exact location and
boundaries, leaving a copy of the Uniform
Real Estate Contract (Ex. P-6) with the metes
and bounds description of the 40 acre parcel.

930525-CA
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dimensions of the property surveyed and of
the improvements located thereon; and further
that there are no encroachments on said
property.
For the next several years, third-party plaintiffs used and
improved what they believed to be their forty acres, including
the twenty acres west of Red Creek. When they paid the balance
of the purchase price, they received a warranty deed dated
October 24, 1980, with a metes and bounds description similar to
the incorrect one on the second uniform real estate contract.
The only difference between the two descriptions was that the
warranty deed stated, "Beginning at a point 330 feet West," where
the contract had stated, "Beginning at a Point 320 feet West."
Third-party plaintiff Eugene Kightly testified he had noted the
ten-foot difference but had not been alarmed by what he
considered to be a slight discrepancy and typographical error.
Third-party plaintiffs sold the property to Robert and Karol
Klinger (the Klingers) on July 23, 1983, for $32,000. Before
buying the property, the Klingers had visited it with a realtor
two or three times, using the described survey certificate to
inspect the premises. Third-party plaintiffs accompanied the
Klingers on one visit and—relying on the survey certificate—
showed them the rebar stakes marking twenty acres west of Red
Creek and twenty acres east of Red Creek. The warranty deed to
the Klingers showed the same metes and bounds description as the
warranty deed previously received by third-party plaintiffs.
In early 1985, the Klingers discovered the problem with the
property descriptions. Third-party plaintiffs were notified that
the survey's metes and bounds description placed the west
property boundary only a few feet west of Red Creek and was off
by about one thousand feet. The Klingers successfully sued
third-party plaintiffs for rescission. Third-party plaintiffs
were ordered to return the payments Klingers had already made,
including taxes and interest paid, totaling $13,851.59. When the
Klingers reconveyed the property to third-party plaintiffs, its
value had substantially decreased since 1983.
In May of 1986, third-party plaintiffs sued Calder for
negligence, asserting he failed to "properly survey and locate
the subject property." The trial court granted Calder's motion
to dismiss the case on the ground that the statute of limitation
barred third-party plaintiffs7 suit regarding work done in 1972.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) (1987) (providing "an action for
relief not otherwise provided for by law" must be brought within
four years). In its ruling, the court rejected third-party
plaintiffs' argument that the court should apply the "discovery

930525-CA
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rule"5 to toll the statute of limitation. Third-party plaintiffs
had asserted that their "cause of action arose when the mistake
was discovered, in January or February of 1985." Third-party
plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which reversed the
trial court and held "[t]he discovery rule should be applied to
the statute of limitation for surveyor negligence under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-25(2)." Klinaer v. Rightlv, 791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah
1990).
On remand, a trial was held to determine Calder's liability.
The trial court found Calder "negligent in the survey of the
property, which resulted in Plaintiff selling the wrong
property." The court awarded third-party plaintiffs "$29,383.00,
together with interest thereon . . . from July 30, 1987, the date
of reconveyance of the subject property to Third Party
Plaintiffs, in the amount of $15,915.80, together with costs in
the amount of $1,279.72." Calder appeals from that judgment.
ISSUES
Calder asserts the following on appeal: (1) The trial court
misapplied the discovery rule to the statute of limitation; (2)
John Stafford's diary should not have been excluded as hearsay
evidence; (3) the trial court erred in finding and calculating
damages; and (4) prejudgment interest should not have been
awarded.6
5. In an earlier appeal of this case, the Utah Supreme Court
explained the "discovery rule":
Under the discovery rule, a cause of action
does not accrue and the statute of limitation
does not begin to run until the plaintiff
learns of or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have learned of the facts
which give rise to the cause of action. The
discovery rule functions as an exception to
the normal application of a statute of
limitation.
Klinaer v. Rightly. 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 1990) (footnotes
omitted).
6. Calder also argues that certain costs should not have been
awarded and that the trial court should not have denied without a
hearing his objections to the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
Calder7s argument about the award of costs is merely a
labeling problem. The trial court included "costs" from both the
Klinger rescission trial and third-party plaintiffs' appeal of
(continued...)
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ANALYSIS
I. Statute of Limitation
Calder makes the following argument: Because third-party
plaintiffs knew in 1980 that their deed showed a metes and bounds
description ten feet different from that shown in the second
uniform real estate contract, they should have investigated and
discovered the larger problem of the survey then. Thus, the
trial court should have found the discovery rule tolled the fouryear statute of limitation only until 1980, and barred the action
brought in 1986.
Calder asks this court to revisit the exact issue the
supreme court decided in the prior appeal. See Klinaer v.
Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 1990). Because application of
the discovery rule is a question of law, Id. at 869, the supreme
court reviewed the case de novo and weighed the prejudice that
would accrue to each side if the rule were applied. Deciding the
discovery rule should be applied in this case to toll the statute
of limitation and allow third-party plaintiffs' case to go
forward, the court said: MTh[ird-party plaintiffs] had no reason
to suspect that the survey was inaccurate, nor did they refrain
from doing anything that might reasonably have been expected of
them that could have disclosed the error." Id. at 872.
Accordingly, we conclude that the prior ruling of the
supreme court is controlling as the law of this case. See
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946-47 (Utah 1987); Murohv v.
Crosland. 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 59 n.l (Utah App. 1994). The
trial court had no choice but to do what it did—comply with the
supreme court's determination and hold a trial on the merits,
without further addressing the statute of limitation issue.

6. (...continued)
Calder's dismissal from that action. Those amounts should have
been awarded as damages, not costs. Cf. South Sanpitch Co. v.
Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1988) ("[W]hen the natural
consequence of one's negligence is another's involvement in a
dispute with a third party, attorney fees reasonably incurred in
resolving the dispute are recoverable from the negligent party as
an element of damages.")
The argument that the trial court improperly denied Calder's
request for a hearing is without merit; thus, we decline to
address it. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989).

930525-CA

6

II. Hearsay Evidence
A. Admitting business record
Calder argues that the trial court committed reversible
error when it refused to admit into evidence the diary of
surveyor John Stafford pursuant to the business record exception
to the hearsay rule. Stafford died before the trial, but left
dated notes about the survey in a business diary. Calder/s
attorney offered the diary as evidence of the relationship
between the parties at the time of the survey. In particular, he
asserted the diary would show Strawberry River—not third-party
plaintiffs—hired the surveyors.7
We defer to the trial court's decision about whether a
proper foundation for evidence admission M*is laid and sufficient
showing of the credibility of the evidence is established. The
ruling of the trial court in this regard will not be overturned
unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion.'" Procon
Corp. v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 876 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah App.
1994) (quoting State ex rel. Marcruez, 560 P.2d 342, 342-43 (Utah
1977) (footnote omitted)).
Hearsay is ,fa statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.11 Utah R.
Evid. 801(c). Stafford's diary was indeed hearsay. It contained
statements by Stafford, who could not testify at the trial,
offered to prove the truth of Calder's assertion that Strawberry
River—not third-party plaintiffs—hired the surveyor.
However, business records satisfying the criteria of Utah
Rule of Evidence 803(6) are not excluded as hearsay.8 "For
7. He also asserted the diary would show the surveyors based
their survey on the "Edmund Allen plat," see supra note 2, not
the metes and bounds description on the uniform real estate
contract. We address this assertion in footnote nine.
8.

Utah Rule of Evidence 803(6) states:
Records of regularly conducted activity. A
memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or
near the time by . . . a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the . . . data compilation,
(continued...)
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evidence to be admissible as a business record, a proper
foundation must be laid to establish the necessary indicia of
reliability." State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983).
The four requirements for a proper foundation are as follows:
"(1) the record must be made in the regular
course of the business or entity which keeps
the records; (2) the record must have been
made at the time of, or in close proximity
to, the occurrence of the act, condition or
event recorded; (3) the evidence must support
a conclusion that after recordation the
document was kept under circumstances that
would preserve its integrity; and (4) the
sources of the information from which the
entry was made and the circumstances of the
preparation of the document were such as to
indicate its trustworthiness."
Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 33
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184). The
foundation must be laid using "the testimony of the custodian [of
business records] or other qualified witness." See Utah R. Evid.
803(6).
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
rejecting the testimony of Floyd Ostler, Stafford's co-worker in
1972, as a "qualified witness" to establish a proper foundation
for admitting Stafford's diary.9 "The foundation facts may be
8.

(...continued)
all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless
the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness . . . .

9. Admittedly, Calder's counsel unartfully laid the foundation;
however, we construe "rules governing the business record
exception broadly." Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1183. See also In re
Japanese Electronic Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 289 (3d Cir. 1983)
(stating "the regular practice requirement should be generously
construed to favor admission").
Also, Calder/s counsel initially tried to use Calder's
testimony to establish a foundation for the diary's admission.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit
the diary based on Calder's testimony. Calder was not a
"qualified witness" under Rule 803(6). He was not in business
with Stafford at the time of the survey and was not "a person
with knowledge," Utah R. Evid. 803(6).

930525-CA
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proved by any relevant evidence and the person making the entries
in the records need not be called to authenticate them if they
can be identified by someone else who is qualified by knowledge
of the facts." Olathe Readv-Mix Co. v. Frazier, 556 P.2d 198,
199 (Kan. 1976); see also Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 981
(Utah 1993) ("[R]ule 803(6) allows any qualified witness to lay
the proper foundation for a record, not just the custodian or the
person who created the record. ••) .
Meeting requirements one and two of the Bertul standard,
Ostler's testimony established that Stafford's diary was kept in
the regular course of their business and contemporaneous with the
events of 1972. He stated, "I'm aware that he [Stafford] did
keep a diary and he knew he was keeping one at the same time
because each one of us [Gunderson, Ostler, and Stafford] got a
diary at the same time." Also, confirming its contemporaneous
nature, the diary contains regular dated entries regarding the
trio's survey activities. See In re Japanese Electronic Prods..
723 F.2d at 288 (stating "requirements for qualification as a
business record can be met by . . . a combination of direct and
circumstantial evidence").
Requirements three and four address the trustworthiness or
reliability of the diary (i.e., preservation of integrity and
circumstances of preparation). Bertul. 664 P.2d at 1184. A
court need not "independently analyze the procedures used by a
business or its employees in making regularly kept records of
regularly conducted business activity. The principal indice
[sic] of reliability is that reliance on routine record keeping
is essential to ongoing business activity." In re Japanese
Electronic Prods.. 723 F.2d at 289. In other words, when the
proponent of a document meets requirements one and two—regarding
routine, contemporaneous record keeping—a presumption arises
that the document is admissible as a trustworthy or reliable
business record. The burden then shifts to the opponent of the
evidence to "overcomefe] that badge of reliability by showing
other reasons for untrustworthiness." Id. at 291.
Here, we have already concluded Calder met requirements one
and two with the testimony of a "qualified witness"; thus, the
burden shifted to third-party plaintiffs to "show[] other reasons
for untrustworthiness," id., under requirements three and four.
Third-party plaintiffs objected to the admission of Stafford's
diary because Ostler's testimony was being used to establish a
foundation for admission. Their objection challenged the
"qualified witness" criterion, not the inherent trustworthiness
of the diary. Thus, third-party plaintiffs did not overcome the
presumption that the diary was admissible. Accordingly, the
trial court abused its discretion when it refused to admit
Stafford's diary into evidence under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.
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B. Harmless error
However, our inquiry does not end here. The trial court's
error in refusing to admit the diary was harmless. •• [E]rrors
which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially affected
the substantial rights of the party complaining, when substantial
justice has been done, do not require reversal." State v.
Mitchell. 672 P.2d 1, 9 (Kan. 1983); see also State ex. rel. J.C.
v. Cruz. 808 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Utah App. 1991) (holding admission
of evidence harmless because error likely did not change result).
Calder's purpose in introducing the diary was "to clarify
who hired whom to do what, when the survey was performed, the
location of the survey, etc."10 Because the survey's time and
location are not at issue, we need not address the diary's
ability to clarify those details. We must, however, determine
whether the identity of the original surveyors' employer affects
the result of the negligence analysis. In particular, we must
determine whether third-party plaintiffs may prevail in a
negligence action against Calder, even if Strawberry River hired
the original surveyors.
The negligent surveyor in Price-Orem Investment Co. v.
Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc.. 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986), argued
its obligations ran only to the general contractor, the party
with whom it had contracted to survey a shopping center site.
Id. at 59. The surveyor asserted that because the owner of the
site—the general contractor's employer—was not in privity of
contract with the surveyor, it had no standing to sue the
surveyor for negligence. Id. Holding "privity of contract is
not a necessary prerequisite to liability," the Utah Supreme

10. He also wanted the diary to show that Strawberry River had
given the survey party the "Edmund Allen plat" as a basis for the
survey. Third-party plaintiffs' contrary position was that they
had given the survey party the metes and bounds description on
the second real estate contract as a basis for the survey.
Because the surveyors apparently did properly stake out lots 31
and 32, as depicted on the "Edmund Allen plat," Calder may have
hoped to show that the survey therefore was not negligent.
Calder's argument fails to account for the fact that both the
proper dimensions of lots 31 and 32 and the incorrect metes and
bounds description appear on the survey certificate. Apparently,
the surveyors used both documents to prepare the certificate.
Because the dimensions of lots 31 and 32 and the metes and bounds
description conflict, a discrepancy appears on the certificate
Calder signed. Calder's argument that the surveyors used the
"Edmund Allen plat" as the sole basis for the survey is in error.
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Court applied a negligent misrepresentation analysis.
tort of negligent misrepresentation allows a party

Id.

The

injured by reasonable reliance upon a second
party's careless or negligent
misrepresentation of a material fact [to]
recover damages resulting from that injury
when the second party had a pecuniary
interest in the transaction, was in a
superior position to know the material facts,
and should have reasonably foreseen that the
injured party was likely to rely upon the
fact.
Id.
We first address the reliance element. The trial court's
findings regarding third-party plaintiff's reliance on "second
party" Calder's negligent misrepresentation of a material fact—
i.e., the survey certificate's surface discrepancies regarding
the property boundaries—are unchallenged.11 The court found
third-party plaintiffs relied on the survey certificate in two
ways: (1) They used the certificate when they showed the
property and its corner markers to the Klingers, the future
buyers of the property, and (2) they gave the Klingers a deed
with a legal metes and bounds description "confirmed by the
Certificate of Survey." Thus, third-party plaintiffs meet the
reliance requirement.
Second, we determine whether "second party" Calder "had a
pecuniary interest in the transaction," id. Although the trial
court made no direct findings on this aspect, Calder admitted in
his trial testimony, "I agreed that for a fee I would sign the
[survey certificate]." Calder's fee gave him the requisite
pecuniary interest.

11. Calder does challenge third-party plaintiffs' reliance on
the survey certificate in the technical transfer of the property,
in that the deed conveying the property from third-party
plaintiffs to the Klingers mirrored the metes and bounds
description found on third-party plaintiffs' deed, not the
inaccurate description found on the certificate. Because thirdparty plaintiffs regarded the 10-foot discrepancy between the
description on the certificate and the description on their own
deed to be a minor error not warranting attention, see supra p.
5, the trial court reasonably could have found they continued to
rely on the certificate in drafting the Klingers' deed. See Cook
Consultants. Inc. v. Larson, 700 S.W.2d 231, 234-37 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding indirect reliance is sufficient).
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Third, we conclude Calder "was in a superior position to
know the material facts," id. A licensed professional surveyor,
Calder—unlike the laymen third-party plaintiffs—had the
training and experience to verify the survey results.
Finally, we consider whether Calder "should have reasonably
foreseen that the injured party was likely to rely upon the
[survey certificate]," id. In Price-Orem, the supreme court
summarily stated, "Price-Orem, as the owner of the property for
whose benefit the shopping center was being constructed [by the
contractor who ordered the survey], was clearly a party whose
justifiable reliance upon the accuracy of the survey might be
reasonably foreseen." Jd. at 60. We likewise conclude that
third-party plaintiffs as the owners of the property for whose
benefit the survey was done, were "clearly a party whose
justifiable reliance upon the accuracy of the survey might be
reasonably foreseen," id.
We therefore determine that whether third-party plaintiffs
or Strawberry River hired the original surveyors does not affect
the validity of the trial court's negligence analysis. Thus, the
trial court's refusal to admit Stafford's diary did not prejudice
Calder's substantial rights and reversal is not required.12 See
Mitchell, 672 P.2d at 9; State ex. rel. J.C.. 808 P.2d at 1136.
III. Damages
Calder lumps under his argument against the award of damages
the following grievances with the trial court's decision: (1)
Damages should not have been awarded because Calder did not
proximately cause third-party plaintiffs' damages; (2) the trial
court improperly measured damages; (3) damages awarded were not
foreseeable; and (4) the trial court's assessment of the
property's fair market value was unsupported by the evidence.
A. Causation
Calder argues that, even if he was negligent, his signing of
the survey certificate did not proximately cause third-party
plaintiffs' injury. Our review of surveyor negligence cases
shows courts typically find proximate cause to exist when an
injured plaintiff relied on the surveyor's negligent
misrepresentation and the surveyor could foresee that reliance.
See Bell v. Jones, 523 A.2d 982, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Walker v.
Hurd. 394 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (reliance only);
Hostetler v. W. Gray & Co.. 523 So. 2d 1359, 1368 (La. Ct. App.
12. Alternatively, the trial court could have used the above
analysis to support a ruling that the diary was irrelevant under
Utah Rule of Evidence 402.
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1988) (same); McKinnon v. Batte, 485 So. 2d 295, 299 (Miss. 1986)
(same); Cook Consultants. Inc. v. Larson, 700 S.W.2d 231, 237
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985) ; see also Steffenson v. Smiths Management
Co.. 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993) ("[F]oreseeability is an
element of proximate cause.") We have already decided thirdparty plaintiffs relied on Calder's negligent misrepresentation
and their reliance was reasonably foreseeable by Calder; thus, we
need not further address this argument.13
13. Calder cursorily advances two other arguments against
finding he proximately caused third-party plaintiffs/ damages.
First, he contends Strawberry River, not Calder, caused the
damages. After all, Strawberry River originated the inaccurate
metes and bounds description when it prepared the second real
estate contract. Alternatively, he argues that whoever drafted
the deed conveying the property from third-party plaintiffs to
the Klingers caused the damages. That draftsman duplicated in
the Klingers' deed the inaccurate metes and bounds description
found in third-party plaintiffs' deed.
"Proximate cause" is a cause substantially connected to the
plaintiff's injury. See McCorvev v. Utah State Dep't of Transp.,
868 P.2d 41, 45 (Utah 1993); Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.. 853
P.2d 877, 887 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Hall v.
Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 169, 417 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1966);
George v. LPS HOSP.. 797 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Utah App. 1990)
(quoting Hamil v. Bashline. 392 A.2d 1280, 1289 (Pa. 1978)),
cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (1991). Causation is a question of
fact. House v. Armour of America, Inc., 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 14,
19 (Utah App. 1994). We review the trial court's findings of
fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a); Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah
1993). A trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous
only if they are not supported by the clear weight of the
evidence, Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989), as
viewed in a light most favorable to the findings, State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
We cannot say the trial court's finding that Calder
proximately caused third-party plaintiffs7 injury was clearly
erroneous. The record supports the trial court's implicit
determination that neither Strawberry River nor the drafter of
the Klingers' deed proximately caused third-party plaintiffs'
injury, even though they may have "actually caused" it. See
Sullivan. 853 P.2d at 887 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Many causes can combine to produce an effect, with one or
more emerging as the proximate cause. See id.; George, 797 P.2d
at 1122 (quoting Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1289); Hess v. Robinson. 109
Utah 60, 62-63, 163 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah 1945). Strawberry
River's "negligence" could have been termed a "remote cause," see
Hess. 163 P.2d at 511, or a "superseded cause," see McCorvev. 868
(continued...)
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B. Measure of damages
Calder contends the trial court applied the wrong measure of
damages. To calculate damages, the trial court subtracted the
"present" value of third-party plaintiffs' forty acres ($6,000)
from the price at which third-party plaintiffs sold the original
property to the Klingers ($32,000), then added the closing costs
on that sale ($3,383), for a total of $29,383. We affirm the
trial court's award of damages as a "pecuniary loss suffered . .
. as a consequence of the plaintiff's reliance upon [Calder's]
misrepresentation." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552B(1)(b)
(1976); see Acculocr, Inc. v. Peterson. 692 P.2d 728, 731 (Utah
1984) .
C. Foreseeability of damages
Because the property's value soared from the time of the
survey to the time third-party plaintiffs sold the property to
the Klingers, then plummeted before the Klingers rescinded the
land contract, Calder argues the damages were not foreseeable.
In other words, he contends he should not have to compensate
third-party plaintiffs for an "artificial spike" in the region's
real estate market, when they now own the same property they have
always owned, excluding the Klingers' truncated tenure. This
argument is without merit. A licensed surveyor—like Calder—
regularly dealing with real estate should be aware of the
potential over time for wide fluctuations in property values.
Thus, he could reasonably be expected to foresee that a
negligently performed survey can result in future damages
commensurate with those fluctuations.

13. (...continued)
P.2d at 45. The trial court found the survey was done
specifically to verify the property description originated by
Strawberry River. The trial court could have found that if the
survey had been done correctly, it would have alerted third-party
plaintiffs to the inaccurate metes and bounds description; they
would then have been able to immediately seek redress from
Strawberry River. Years later, Strawberry River is defunct and
that remedy is no longer available. "But for" their reliance on
Calder's survey, third-party plaintiffs could have cured their
initial injury at the hands of Strawberry River long ago. See
Weber ex rel. Weber v. Sprinaville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1367
(Utah 1986).
Also, third-party plaintiffs obviously did not rely to their
injury on the property description in the Klinger's deed; they
relied on the description in their own deed and in the survey
certificate. Thus, the drafter of the Klinger's deed did not
proximately cause their injury.
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D. Trial court's assessment of fair market value
Calder maintains the trial court's determination of the
property's "present" fair market value at $6,000 was unsupported
by the evidence. We presume a trial court's award of damages to
be correct and will overturn it only if it is clearly erroneous
with no reasonable support in the evidence. Gillmor v. Gillmor,
745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278
(1988) .
A real estate appraiser testified third-party plaintiffs had
received an offer for $10,000, but "[i]t was with a thousand
dollars down which would barely cover their costs so they
basically would get nothing out of it, and then it was on a 10year payoff." He further testified that "if they could get 8,000
cash . . . they'd be doing very well." Finally, he stated he had
recently sold a nearby fifty-two acres "that's better than
theirs" for $3,000. The trial court reasonably valued the
property at $6,000, well within the range of values proposed by
the expert witness. Accordingly, we cannot say this finding is
clearly erroneous or without support in the record.
IV. Prejudgment Interest
Calder argues the trial court erred in awarding third-party
plaintiffs prejudgment interest. The award of prejudgment
interest is a question of law, which we review for correctness.
Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah App. 1994).
The following guidelines apply to awards of prejudgment
interest:
[W]here the damage is complete and the amount
of loss fixed as of a particular time, and
that loss can be measured by facts and
figures, interest should be allowed from that
time and not from the date of the judgment.
On the other hand, where damages are
incomplete or cannot be calculated with
mathematical accuracy . . . the amount of the
damage must be ascertained and assessed by
the trier of the fact at the trial, and in
such cases prejudgment interest is not
allowed.
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d
475, 482 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Biork v. April Indus., Inc.,
560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930
(1977)). In Price-Orem, this court denied the plaintiff
prejudgment interest because "damages ascertained by determining
the fair market value of real property . . . xcannot be
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determined with mathematical precision, [and] may be inherently
uncertain.'" Id. at 483 (quoting Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d
1316, 1325 (Wyo. 1984)).
Here, the trial court calculated the damages using the
"present" fair market value of the property. The imprecise
testimony of the real estate appraiser quoted above shows that
the amount fixed by the trial court was calculated with
mathematical inaccuracy and was inherently uncertain. Thus, the
trial court erred when it awarded third-party plaintiffs
prejudgment interest.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court in observing the supreme court's
application of the discovery rule to this case and awarding
damages. Further, we conclude that the trial court's rejection
of Stafford's diary as evidence was harmless error. We also
reverse the trial court's award of prejudgment interest to thirdparty plaintiffs. We remand this case to the trial court to
revise the judgment in accordance with this opinion.
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